SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THE ALLOCATION OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN DEFAMATION CASES IN LIGHT OF LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS

Abstract

This article offers a legal analysis of the allocation of the burden of proof in defamation cases in light of the 2025 amendments to the Law of Georgia on Freedom of Speech and Expression. It examines the value-based conflict between freedom of
expression and the protection of personality rights and assesses the extent to which the revised definition of defamation and the reversed burden-of-proof model comply with international standards, including the case law of the European Court of Human
Rights. The article is based on comparative legal analysis and evaluates approaches developed in European, German, and Anglo-American legal systems. Particular attention is paid to the distinction between statements of fact and value judgments, the
differing legal status of public and private individuals, and the importance of procedural fairness and proportionality in allocating the burden of proof. The article concludes that, although the legislative amendments are generally compatible with international
approaches, their practical application requires careful and context-sensitive judicial assessment in order to avoid disproportionate restrictions on freedom of expression.