The Scope of Judicial Discretion when Considering the Admissibility of Claims Filed against Gender-Based Violence Survivors

ანოტაცია

Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP) represent an increasingly prevalent mechanism for constraining the freedom of expression of gender-based violence survivors. This study argues that defamation lawsuits filed against survivors constitute continued psychological and economic violence under Georgian law, functioning as instruments of intimidation and manipulation. Drawing upon European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence – particularly Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan regarding states’ obligations to ensure safe environments for public participation – the analysis examines how SLAPP litigation intersects with Georgian procedural frameworks.
Employing hermeneutical and comparative legal methodologies, the study analyses Georgian judicial practice alongside anti-SLAPP mechanisms in California (Code of Civil Procedure para. 425.16) and Canada (Courts of Justice Act para. 137.1). The research demonstrates that Georgian legislation provides adequate foundation for protecting survivors’ expression rights through Article 5(2) of the Law on Freedom of Speech and Expression, which affords defendants procedural opportunity to petition for dismissal at the preparatory stage. Analysis of Tbilisi City Court and Supreme Court decisions reveals that the fundamental challenge lies in courts’ formalistic interpretation – particularly restrictive application of courtroom speech privilege failing to protect statements submitted to law enforcement or the Public Defender’s Office. The paper acknowledges competing constitutional values including due process rights, presumption of innocence, and legitimate reputational interests. Nevertheless, it recommends that courts reallocate evidentiary burdens according to the in dubio pro libertate principle and adopt progressive interpretations of courtroom speech privilege encompassing statements submitted to competent authorities.