Artificial Intelligence and the Legal Superposition Concept

Abstract

The article analyzes two main approaches to determining the legal status of artificial intelligence. The first treats artificial intelligence as an object of law, while the second relies on the legal fiction of recognizing it as a partial legal subject. The analysis demonstrates that both approaches are inadequate: the objective model fails to address the challenges posed by artificial intelligence’s
autonomous actions, whereas the subjective model risks violating the fundamental principles of the legal system. The research is based on comparative legal and functionalist methods and includes an analysis of both international and Georgian legal practice. The paper proposes a superpositional legal concept, according to which the status of artificial intelligence should be determined dynamically, in the context of a specific legal relationship. This approach combines the elements of the object of
law and the functionally limited subject, creating a hybrid model that ensures the flexibility and consistency of the legal system. In addition, it is emphasized that the effective integration of artificial intelligence requires not only formal subjectivity but also the development of mechanisms for materially ensuring accountability.
The research concludes that the legal regulation of artificial intelligence should be based on a functional, context-dependent approach that preserves the anthropocentric foundations of law while addressing the challenges posed by modern technological development. The presented model can be used as both a theoretical and practical tool for determining the legal status of artificial intelligence, particularly in jurisdictions where the regulatory framework is still in the process of formation, including that of Georgia.